Original Korean article: 인천투데이
Incheon Today = Reporter Lee Jong-seon | It has been confirmed that Ørsted, a Danish state-owned enterprise pursuing the development of an offshore wind farm in waters off Incheon, experienced an accident in which a structure fell entirely into the sea at an offshore wind farm it owns. Following this incident, various European countries declared navigation-prohibited zones around facilities of the same model. However, in waters off Incheon, the project is being pursued without maintaining sufficient distance from shipping lanes, raising concerns about controversy.
Rotor and nacelle fall entirely from Ørsted-operated wind farm
On April 6, 2022, at the Anholt offshore wind farm (400MW, Siemens Gamesa 3.6–4.0MW turbines) operated by Ørsted in Denmark, a rotor (blades plus hub) and nacelle separated entirely and fell into the sea. This facility is directly operated by Ørsted. According to an investigation by manufacturer Siemens, the cause was determined to be welding damage (cracking) at the flange component where the tower and nacelle connect. While the direct cause of the accident was a welding defect due to aging infrastructure, the follow-up measures led to shipping lane concerns. Siemens declared navigation-prohibited zones around offshore wind farms in neighboring countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom that used the same model turbines to prevent secondary accidents. A "Offshore Wind Safety Accident Case Study" (Korea Electric Power Corporation Offshore Wind Business Division, December 2022) that addressed this case presented as a lesson that "supplementation of separation distance and shipping lane standards to prevent ship collisions in case of offshore collapse" was needed. This means that when a structure collapses, the damage can be transferred to ships in nearby shipping lanes.
Fallen blade collided with ship in UK
The case study also includes an accident at the Ormonde wind farm in the UK (150MW, 5.0MW turbines manufactured by Repower, operated by Vattenfall). During maintenance work, the rotor (blades plus hub) binding component was damaged and fell into the sea, and this falling object collided with a nearby ship. The case study noted "ship damage and component loss due to offshore collapse during blade replacement" and "possibility of secondary major accidents such as worker casualties and ship sinking." Additionally, under the section "Collision between offshore wind structures and ships," the case study cited unexpected wave heights and rough seas, poor anchors, reduced visibility due to fog and heavy rain, and operator inexperience as collision causes, and stated that "the probability of casualties is very high when a foundation collides with a ship, and the degree of damage to both the ship and foundation structure from collision is severe." The case study also addressed in a separate section accidents involving maintenance vessels docking at foundation structures, explaining that cases of small vessels under 200 tons capsizing or sinking while docking in high waves and rough seas are repeatedly occurring.
These cases show a common point: "structures that are not sufficiently distant from shipping lanes will eventually collide with ships." This concern is even greater for passenger ship routes off Incheon, where sea fog frequently causes service suspensions.
Like building a massive wind turbine right next to a highway
The reason these accidents keep happening is simple. A road must have its own width, and whatever is built next to it must maintain sufficient separation distance from the road to be safe. If you think of a passenger ship route as a highway, it is easy to imagine the case where an offshore wind farm is built right up against the highway. If a structure is built flush against the road boundary, any slight drift of vehicles causes a collision. The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries notice "Guidelines for Implementation of Maritime Traffic Safety Diagnosis" formalizes this logic exactly. The line connecting the outermost generators of an offshore wind farm must maintain a minimum interval of at least 0.5 nautical miles (926 meters) from the path of transiting ships. When located on the right side of a shipping lane, it must secure a distance of 6 times the maximum length of transiting ships plus 500 meters and 0.3 nautical miles (555 meters), and when on the left side, 6 times the maximum ship length plus 500 meters. This is due to concerns that, as in the Ørsted case mentioned earlier, massive offshore wind turbine blades can be damaged or lost due to internal and external impacts and cause secondary damage to nearby ships. The European Union guideline is stricter, setting the minimum safety distance between the external boundary of a wind farm and a transportation route at 2 nautical miles.
Already reduced project area due to failure to secure separation distance...another hidden problem
The problem is that Ørsted Korea experienced an accident at its own facility and the declaration of a navigation-prohibited zone as a result, yet failed to secure sufficient separation distance from shipping lanes from the outset in waters off Incheon. Ørsted received three consecutive deferral decisions at the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy's Electric Power Committee review in 2023 due to the overlap problem with the Incheon-Baengnyeong passenger ship route. Only in November of that year did the company reduce the project area by approximately 30 percent and revise the project area to be at least 1 nautical mile (1.85 kilometers) away from the passenger ship safety route before obtaining approval. Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Defense on September 25, 2024 requested an additional movement of at least 1 nautical mile north and south based on the coordinates of the Northwest Islands ship navigation regulations for the ground survey area, and it was found that even when applying the design standards of the Maritime Traffic Safety Diagnosis Implementation Guidelines, the northern boundary line would need to be moved back again. It is a case of being restricted again even after one reduction.
The Incheon 2 (IC2) offshore wind project pursued by Korea Midland Power is in a similar situation. The Incheon Regional Maritime and Fisheries Administration determined that the IC2 project area overlaps directly with the passenger ship route to the West Sea Three Islands (Baengnyeong, Daecheong, and Socheong islands) and submitted an opposing opinion. In response, Incheon Today attempted to contact Ørsted Korea multiple times but was unable to receive a response.
KWI project profile — Incheon 1 · Incheon 2
This article concerns 2 projects in the same development. Compiled from the KWI database. Not part of the source article.
Incheon 1 Offshore Wind
| Capacity | 870 MW |
| Location | Incheon |
| Developer | Ørsted (with KOEN · POSCO MOU) |
| Status | EBL Approved |
| Licence | Electricity Business Licence 2023 |
| EIA | main-phase consultation under way (ME2025C009) |
Incheon 2 Offshore Wind
| Capacity | 600 MW |
| Location | Incheon |
| Developer | Ørsted (with KOEN · POSCO MOU) |
| Status | EBL Approved |
| Licence | Electricity Business Licence 2023 |
| EIA | main-phase consultation under way (ME2025C010) |
Related coverage
- Ørsted Incheon offshore wind project faces further area reduction — 2026-08-15
- Incheon Offshore Wind Faces North Korea NLL Security Dilemma — 2026-08-13
- Incheon Offshore Wind Developers Form Alliance Amid City Coordination Gap — 2026-08-04
- Incheon Applies for 6 Trillion Won Public-Led Offshore Wind Farm License — 2026-07-31
Project data: KWI database — Electricity Business Licence records, EIA filings (ME2025C009, ME2025C010), and Electricity Regulatory Commission minutes.
